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ABSTRACT 
 
This study examined whether the board of directors had an impact on the trajectory of 
organizational strategy, where the composition of the board might influence the likelihood of 
pursuing or halting a persistent, unchanging strategy.  Our data suggest that a board that 
exhibited moderate agency-orientation displayed a more positive relationship to strategic 
persistence than either a neutral board or a strong agency-focused board.  This finding may 
indicate that a neutral board, may benefit from the cooperation required to reach agreement and 
that a moderately agency-oriented board may not be able to effectively reap the benefits of either 
control or collaboration and may only serve as window dressing in its purported function of 
representing shareholder interests. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
orporate boards and top executives are under tremendous pressure to maintain or extend periods of 
strong financial performance.  Not surprisingly, executives and boards have a tendency to maintain the 
status quo and continue policies and strategies that have been successful in the past.  This tendency, 
called strategic persistence, has gotten considerable attention by researchers over the years.  If fact, numerous 
researchers have found strategic persistence in industries ranging from the software industry to the furniture industry 
(Finkelstein and Hambrick 1990; Lant, Milliken et al. 1992; Boeker 1997).  Building upon this foundation, others 
have examined strategic persistence during periods of radical change (Audia, Locke et al. 2000; Hill and Rothaermel 
2003; Nickerson and Silverman 2003).  Still others have focused on the behavioral and psychological biases 
exhibited by top management teams (TMTs) and boards in making strategic decisions (Staw, McKechnie et al. 
1983; Westphal and Bednar 2005).   
 
It is against this backdrop that we examine board composition and strategic persistence.  More specifically, 
we integrate the findings in the strategic persistence literature with the contrasting approaches of agency and 
stewardship theory in the corporate governance literature.   In doing so, we build upon foundational theory of 
strategic persistence while providing additional evidence of the benefits and/or consequences of popular board 
structures.  Thus, for the purpose of the study, we examine whether boards, classified as exhibiting agency 
tendencies or stewardship tendencies, influence the phenomenon called strategic persistence. 
 
THEORETICAL BACKGROUND 
 
Prior studies have shown that organizational strategic persistence can be attributed to a number of factors, 
including past success reinforcing current action sets (Lant, Milliken et al. 1992; Boeker 1997; Audia, Locke et al. 
2000), firm inability to adapt to environmental change (Hill and Rothaermel 2003; Nickerson and Silverman 2003), 
and managerial attributions, discretion, and control (Pfeffer 1981; Mintzberg 1983; Finkelstein and Hambrick 1990).  
Finkelstein and Hambrick defined strategic persistence as “the extent to which a firm’s strategy remains stable over 
time.”  While strategic persistence may sustain firm performance during periods of environmental stability, 
dysfunctional persistence following a radical environmental change causes firm performance to decline relative to 
industry competitors (Audia, Locke et al. 2000; Nickerson and Silverman 2003).  Theories as diverse as upper 
C 
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echelon theory, behavioral psychology and managerial cognition, and organizational dynamics have been utilized to 
describe how strategic persistence occurs and its impacts on firm performance in changing environmental 
conditions, but the internal mechanisms for controlling or halting cycles of dysfunctional persistence have received 
little research attention.  Research into strategic reorientation and firm underperformance in relation to control of the 
firm has focused on displacement of the management team through externally motivated actions such as hostile 
takeovers, acquisitions, and forced succession.  Studies on the topic of executive succession have demonstrated that 
replacement of the CEO may bring about strategic change (Brown 1982; Tushman, Virany et al. 1985; Kesner and 
Sebora 1994; Bigley and Wiersema 2002), inferring that any strategic persistence that might have existed would be 
stopped.  The board of directors serves as the primary internal, lower cost control mechanism available to 
shareholders through which they may influence firm strategic direction.  Bigley and Wiersema (2002) found a 
positive association between outside board members and the likelihood of strategic reorientation after a change in 
executive leadership.  The effects of board independence, implying a higher degree of monitoring and external 
control, on firm performance have been studied, but there has been no examination of the effect of board 
composition on strategic persistence. 
 
Finkelstein and Hambrick (1990) use upper echelon theory (Hambrick and Mason 1984) to argue that 
strategic persistence is a function of managerial decision making and managerial discretion of the top management 
team.  The dominant coalition (Cyert and March 1963) of top managers, consisting of the CEO and other firm 
executives holding directorships on the board, develops a shared understanding of the organization and its operating 
environment and implements strategy based on this common perspective or organizational paradigm (Pfeffer 1983).  
As the length of team tenure together increases, goal congruence and higher order routines become harmonized.  A 
history of success serves to reinforce organizational strategic action sets and routines in concordance with the 
reinforcement-expectancy model of learning (Cyert and March 1963; Prahalad and Bettis 1986).  Long tenures can 
cause managers to develop habits that rely more on past experience than new stimuli and reduce the adoption of 
novel or unique strategies (Katz 1982).  Finkelstein and Hambrick’s study demonstrated a relationship between 
TMT tenure and firm strategic persistence in high discretion industries (Finkelstein and Hambrick 1990). 
 
The firm is a nexus of contracts (Jensen and Meckling 1976; Fama 1980), within which multiple 
stakeholder groups use their power to assert control over the organization (Pfeffer 1981; Finkelstein 1992), which 
serves to limit the unitary control of the TMT group of internal corporate elites.  The will of internal managers to 
maintain their locus of control and autonomy is evidenced in the accumulation of takeover defenses in the temporal 
distance from the firm IPO (Field and Karpoff 2002).  Shareholders of the firm may utilize external control actions 
such as hostile takeovers and proxy fights to displace underperforming leadership, but they will only pursue external 
control options when the costs of internal control mechanisms become too high (Walsh and Seward 1990).  The 
primary internal control mechanism available to shareholders is the board of directors, through which they might 
influence organizational strategy and correct dysfunctional strategic persistence. 
 
The role of the board in U.S. corporations has long been a source of study and debate.  Where European 
firms maintain a dual board system, with one board serving in an advisory capacity and the other monitoring the 
TMT, U.S. boards perform both functions (Sundaramurthy and Lewis 2003; Adams and Ferreira 2007).  A board 
monitors the TMT to align the interests of the principal and agent – the shareholders and the managers, respectively 
– and to control moral hazard (Jensen and Meckling 1976; Eisenhardt 1989).  Agency theorists argue that 
information asymmetries within the principal-agent relationship lead to the misalignment of interests between 
parties, and that the delegation of responsibilities may be problematic due to misalignment of goals between the 
principal and agent, the inability of the principal to verify the agent is acting appropriately, and divergent attitudes 
toward risk (Eisenhardt 1989).  Proponents argue that agency theory is a control approach whereby an independent 
party monitors and constrains self-serving behavior, without which agents will seek situations and arrangements that 
best suit their self interest, oftentimes to the detriment of the principal. 
 
In contrast, resource dependency and stewardship theories hold that the role of directors is to provide 
support to the organization and the TMT through advising and access to resources.   Resource dependence theory 
has human and relational capital of the board members as antecedents of resource provisioning and holds that the 
legitimacy, expertise, advise, and external contacts provided by board members impact firm performance through 
reducing external contingencies, diminishing uncertainties, and lowering transaction costs (Pfeffer and Salancik 
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1978; Hillman and Dalziel 2003).  Donaldson (1990) argues under stewardship theory that the goal of governance is 
to find an organizational structure that allows coordination to be achieved most effectively.  The definition of 
economic man as opportunistic and subject to moral hazard is too narrow and does not account for cooperation and 
collaboration between managers and owners (Donaldson and Davis 1991; Davis, Schoorman et al. 1997).  The 
primary function of board members within these paradigms is enablement of managers to achieve successful 
organizational outcomes rather than monitoring to control opportunistic behavior. 
 
Attention to the roles and function of the board of directors increased with the passage of the Sarbanes-
Oxley Act.  Adhering to the agency theory tenet that independent directors are more effective at monitoring the 
actions of executives, Sarbanes-Oxley introduced legal requirements regarding the number of outside directors 
appointed to the board.  Though the effectiveness of outside directors at monitoring has been questioned due to their 
membership in the corporate elite and potential for social sanctioning (Westphal and Khanna 2003) and their lack of 
familiarity with organizational routines (Coles, Daniel et al. 2006; Adams and Ferreira 2007), they are still held to 
be better at limiting opportunistic behavior than their inside and affiliated counterparts.  The proportion of outside 
directors has also increased due to the growing ownership and power of large institutional investors, whose large 
positions limit their ability to easily divest their holdings and therefore increase their interest in the control and 
performance of the firm (Hansen and Hill 1991; Gompers and Metrick 2001).  The monitoring activities and 
struggle for power by independent board members act as an internal control mechanism which limits managerial 
discretion. 
 
Outside directors, who are not invested in or constrained by internal organizational routines and cognitions, 
provide environmental scanning (Dutton and Dukerich 1991; Miller and Chen 1994) and different information 
sources in addition to monitoring.  The information and environmental awareness brought by outside directors serve 
as a counterbalance to simplified general managerial rules (Ranson, Hinings et al. 1980) that become reinforced by 
the tenure of the top management team (Finkelstein and Hambrick 1990).  Inside and affiliated directors, on the 
other hand, are more likely to share the same managerial cognitions as the executive team (Smith, Smith et al. 1994; 
Knight, Pearce et al. 1999).  Those members of the board closely associated with the TMT and sharing similar 
cognitive constructions of the organization and similar social networks are also less likely to engage in external 
environmental scanning to assess external market conditions.  Inside and affiliated directors will tend to support and 
reinforce the status quo, enabling the TMT to pursue a course of strategic persistence.  Independent, outside 
directors will be more focused on corporate performance and less invested in maintaining organizational routines 
and status quo, and thus will be more likely to monitor and take action to correct dysfunctional strategic persistence, 
especially under circumstances of changing environmental conditions. 
 
H1:  Organizations with a board that is comprised of more outside, independent directors than inside and 
affiliated directors (an agency-focused, monitoring board) will be negatively associated with the existence 
of strategic persistence. 
 
H2:  Following a discrete and radical environmental change, organizations with a more independent board 
composition (agency-focused, monitoring board) will be more likely to undergo strategic reorientation. 
 
A U.S. board maintains competing responsibilities, balancing monitoring and collaborative advising 
activities, where overemphasis on either approach limits benefits and increases costs (Zajac and Westphal 1994; 
Sundaramurthy and Lewis 2003), which may negatively impact firm performance.  While independent directors may 
be more effective at monitoring, inside and affiliated directors can facilitate coordination through knowledge of 
organizational routines.  Coles et al. (2006) argued that firms with greater levels of complexity and high tacit 
knowledge requirements need more advising input that is provided by internal board members and showed a 
relationship between optimal board size and board composition and firm performance.  These results provide 
support for the stewardship conception of the board where the focus is upon collaboration and coordination 
(Donaldson 1990; Davis, Schoorman et al. 1997).  As the composition of the board shifts towards insider 
representation, the threat of conformity to organizational routines that performed well in the past, shared managerial 
cognition, and reduced environmental scanning and information processing routines (Dutton and Dukerich 1991; 
Miller and Chen 1994) reduce the likelihood that managers will pursue strategic reorientation, even under conditions 
of radical environmental change.  In providing solidarity and support to existing management, a stewardship-
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oriented board will likely reinforce existing practices even in the face of organizational decline (Sundaramurthy and 
Lewis 2003). 
 
H3:  Organizations with a board that is comprised of more inside and affiliated directors than outside, 
independent directors (a stewardship-oriented board) will be associated with higher firm levels of strategic 
persistence and will be less likely to undergo strategic reorientation. 
 
H4:  Following a discrete and radical environmental change, organizations with a more insider board 
composition (stewardship-oriented board) will under perform in their industry and take longer to undertake 
strategic reorientation. 
 
METHOD 
 
Sample 
 
Our sample consisted of the 100 firms comprising the S&P 100 index for the five-year period from 2002 
through 2006.  The range of the five-year period of observations was selected to capture any change in board 
composition towards more agency-focused control in response to the passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the 
subsequent effects on strategic persistence.  Thus, our original sample included 100 companies with five annual 
observations each for a total of 500 observations.   We selected a five-year time period to remain consistent with 
previous studies pertaining to strategic persistence (Finkelstein and Hambrick 1990; Audia, Locke et al. 2000).  The 
S&P 100 index provided a broad sampling of firms in various industries with publicly available financial and board 
composition data. 
 
We gathered pertinent financial statement and board composition data from the Compustat North America, 
the Compustat Executive Compensation, and the RiskMetrics Group Historical Directors databases.  In addition, we 
relied on publicly available Securities and Exchange Commission filings to supplement these data sources.   In the 
event that data was not available for a specific variable, we eliminated the associated company from the sample.  
After adjusting for missing data, 215 observations remained which allowed for the five-year calculation of strategic 
persistence for 43 companies. 
 
MEASURES 
 
Dependent Variable 
 
In operationalizing Strategic Persistence, we relied upon the definition and construct provided by 
Finkelstein and Hambrick (1990) to measure how a firm’s strategy remains fixed over time.  Thus, for the purpose 
of this study, we defined strategic persistence as a composite measure that captures the strategic indicators (1) 
advertising intensity (advertising/sales), (2) research and development intensity (R&D/sales), (3) plant and 
equipment newness (net PP&E/gross PP&E), (4) nonproduction overhead (SGA expenses/sales), (5) inventory 
levels (inventories/sales), and (6) financial leverage (debt/equity).  These measures were chosen because they are 
controllable by top managers, they have a major effect on performance, and they influence a firm’s strategic profile, 
and therefore represent a pattern in a stream of important decisions (Mintzberg 1978).  Each of these measures has 
been utilized previously in the strategic management literature (Schendel and Patton 1978; Finkelstein and 
Hambrick 1990; Audia, Locke et al. 2000). 
 
Once the above mentioned strategic measures were calculated, a composite strategic persistence measure 
was estimated in concordance with Finkelstein and Hambrick’s (1990) computations.  First, we calculated the 
variance for each measure over the five-year period from 2002 through 2006, where (t) represented the focal year 
2003 and t-1 through t+3 represent the five-year range.  Next, the variance of each measure was standardized 
(mean=0, standard deviation=1) by industry, using 2-digit SIC codes to segment industry groups, and multiplied by 
(-1) to appropriately represent the concept of persistence.  The standardized variance scores captured the variability 
in strategic decision patterns over time relative to industry norms.  Finally, all six of the standardized indicators were 
summed to yield an aggregate estimate of strategic persistence (SP1) (Finkelstein and Hambrick 1990). 
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The broad range of industries represented by companies in our data set affected the availability of strategic 
measures, specifically advertising and R&D intensity, as industry differences and practices affect the emphasis or 
use of these strategic capabilities.  Similar to Finkelstein and Hambrick (1990), we estimated a second measure of 
strategic persistence (SP2), which consisted of all the above mentioned measures except advertising intensity and 
R&D intensity. 
 
Independent Variable 
 
Board Composition was estimated from data drawn from the RiskMetrics Group Historical Directors 
(RGHD) database.   The RGHD database provided key board member information including name, age, title, and 
board member classification as independent, employee or affiliate.  For the purpose of this study, we utilized board 
member definitions developed by Huson, Parrino, and Starks (2001), and Lehn, Patro, and Zhao (2004), which 
define independent directors as those who are not current or former employees of the firm or relatives of current 
employees, or those who are not currently employed at an accounting firm, commercial bank, investment bank, 
insurance company, law firm, or consulting firm.  The definition assumes that a board member employed at a 
professional services or finance firm is most likely affiliated with the firm through services provided under contract 
and therefore depends upon management’s discretion for continued gain.  The RGHD database definitions of board 
member classifications appear to be consistent with these definitions.   
 
Since employees, former employees, and affiliated directors may have the potential to gain from their 
relationship with the firm either in the present or in the future, we argue that only those directors classified as 
independent should count as board members who may effectively monitor management in accordance with agency 
tenets.   We calculated the degree of agency-focus of the board as a ratio of outside directors to total number of 
board members, where lower percentages represented stewardship-oriented boards and higher percentages 
represented agency-oriented boards, for the focal year (t).  These ratios were utilized to develop two separate scales 
of board monitoring and advising behavior. 
 
The first scale utilized a log transformation of the direct agency-focus percentages [ ln(BOARD% / (1 – 
BOARD%) ] as a measure of board orientation based on composition (BD).  Performing a log transformation 
produced a continuous scale measurement of orientation where positive values represented an agency-oriented 
board, negative values denoted a stewardship-orientation, and a value of zero indicated a neutral or balanced board 
of insiders and outsiders.  This measure was used to establish a primary relationship between board monitoring 
tendencies and the existence of strategic persistence.  An agency-oriented board should exhibit a negative 
relationship to measures of strategic persistence, as their access to external information, lack of encumbrance by 
organizational routines and paradigms, and monitoring role (Fama and Jensen 1983; Walsh and Seward 1990; 
Beatty and Zajac 1994) should limit or counteract management resistance to strategic reorientation.  Conversely, a 
stewardship-oriented board, which is embedded in organizational routines and may suffer from reduced 
environmental scanning or from pluralistic ignorance (Miller and McFarland 1987; Miller and Nelson 2002) , should 
exhibit a positive relationship to strategic persistence. 
 
The second scale classified boards as either Agency or Stewardship based on the agency-focus percentages, 
where lower percentage boards dominated by  employee and affiliate directors were designated as Stewardship 
boards and higher percentage boards comprised of more outside, independent directors were categorized as Agency 
boards.  Five categories attempted to capture the degree of power held between inside and outside directors: (1) 
Strong Stewardship (SS) = 0% to 20% independent directors, (2) Moderate Stewardship (MS) = >20% up to 40%, 
(3) Neutral (N) = >40% up to 60%, (4) Moderate Agency (MA) = >60% up to 80%, and (5) Strong Agency (SA) = 
>80% independent directors.  This measure tested whether strategic persistence is associated with the degree of 
power wielded by the board subgroup responsible for a particular function (monitoring vs. advising), and provides a 
pseudo-test of the effect of the degree of agency-orientation in overcoming strategic persistence. 
 
Control Variables 
 
Size influences the firm’s ability to alter organizational structure and strategy.  Firms with many employees 
face bureaucratic momentum (Mintzberg 1978) and often have difficulty affecting change (Aldrich 1979).  Size was 
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calculated as the number of employees (in thousands) in the focal year (t) of our study.     
 
CEO Tenure measured the number of years a CEO had held his/her position as of the focal year (t).  Longer 
tenures may increase the likelihood that an organization will continue to pursue an existing strategy (Finkelstein and 
Hambrick 1990), whether due to confidence in the current action set engendered by past success (Lant, Milliken et 
al. 1992; Miller and Chen 1994) or simply due to the CEO’s own resistance to change (Katz 1982).  Our measure of 
tenure focused solely upon the single executive at the head of the firm, which differs from Finkelstein and 
Hambrick’s (1990) approach that considered the tenure and shared cognitions of the dominant coalition of 
managers.  Their operationalization of the dominant coalition included all internal executives of the firm who were 
also members of the board.  Our construct of board composition accounted for insiders on the board and the relative 
power they wield, which addressed our inquiry into the association of board composition to strategic persistence.  
Inclusion of insider board member tenure into a composite tenure measure would likely dilute any relationship 
between board composition and our variable of interest.  In recognition of Finkelstein and Hambrick’s findings, we 
included CEO tenure to control for its effect on persistence. 
 
CEO Turnover captured a change in organizational leadership brought about by CEO succession, whether 
due to retirement, resignation, or termination.  While new CEOs that were groomed as heir apparent and promoted 
internally may be less likely to pursue strategic reorientation (Bigley and Wiersema 2002), most studies of CEO 
succession events have found a higher incidence of strategic reorientation after a change in leadership (Helmich and 
Brown 1972; Brown 1982; Tushman, Virany et al. 1985; Kesner and Sebora 1994).  This variable controlled for the 
negative effect on strategic persistence associated with a succession event and a new CEO’s strategic initiatives.  
Since persistence is an effect that occurs and must be measured over time, our analysis only considered turnover 
events that transpired during the first three years (t-1 to t+1) of the sample. 
 
Past Performance where a firm has a history of success reduces the likelihood that a firm will reorient its 
strategy (Lant, Milliken et al. 1992; Miller and Chen 1994).  Five-year average ROE and ROA measures were 
included as control variables to address the past performance impact on strategic persistence.  Each ratio was 
standardized by subtracting sample industry means and then dividing by sample industry standard deviations 
(Finkelstein and Hambrick 1990). 
 
Slack captures the availability of flexible resources which impacts managerial discretion.  We considered 
both short-term (working capital/sales) and long-term (debt/equity) measures of slack for use in this study.  
However, we determined that the long-term measure of slack was more appropriate because we believe that long-
term strategic decisions that reflect persistence over time have a stronger relationship with long-term debt-to-equity 
financing decisions than with short-term working capital management policies. 
 
Two-digit Standard Industry Classification (SIC) codes were utilized to control for differences in 
performance and fundamentals across industries represented by the sample.  First, the two-digit SIC codes facilitated 
the classification of firms into industry segments which were employed in standardizing variances of the individual 
strategic indicators that underlie our strategic persistence measures (SP1 and SP2).  Second, the SIC codes 
controlled for inter-industry differences amongst firms in our primary regression analyses. 
 
DATA ANALYSIS 
 
In order to complete our analysis, it was necessary to utilize models which can manage the cross-sectional 
and longitudinal dimensions of pooled data.  Consistent with Finkelstein and Hambrick (1990), we relied upon 
methods developed and discussed by Balestra and Nerlove (1966), Wallace and Hussain (1969), Maddala (1977), 
and Mundlak (1978) for managing slope coefficient variation over time and violation of the assumption of 
independence of observations (Hannan and Young 1977) inherent in pooled data sets.  This approach is necessary 
because ordinary least squares (OLS) estimation effectively ignores the pooled nature of the data and treats all the 
observations as though they were independent (Brown 1982).   Given this, as well as the serial correlation from the 
times series aspect of panel data, our analysis called for a GLS (generalized least squares) estimator (Nerlove 1971; 
Maddala 1977). 
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A two-stage, hierarchical regression model was employed first to test the validity of our control model, and 
then to separately test the association of each of our measures of board composition with strategic persistence.  The 
control model sought to confirm the consistency of our model and sample in demonstrating the same relationships 
between strategic persistence and the variables size and tenure that Finkelstein and Hambrick (1990) had found.  
Once the existence of strategic persistence has been established, the initial hierarchical model will examine the 
relationship between persistence measures (SP1 and SP2) and board composition, in terms of the ratio of outside 
directors (BOARD%), to assess the effect of board independence on persistence.  An additional hierarchical model 
will test whether the degree of agency-focus or stewardship focus of the board (SS/MS/N/MA/SA) has a significant 
effect on strategic persistence. 
 
RESULTS 
 
Table 1 presents descriptive statistics (means and standard deviations) and Pearson correlation coefficients 
for the variables in the study.  However, the significance of the correlation coefficients should be reviewed with 
caution given that the data was pooled (Finkelstein and Hambrick 1990).  Similar to Finkelstein and Hambrick’s 
(1990) findings, firm size was positively and significantly correlated with our measure of strategic persistence and 
slack was negatively correlated though not significantly.  Our initial analysis did not show an association between 
persistence and our measure of tenure, contrary to prior research.  Of note is that average CEO tenure in our sample 
was just 5.3 years with a standard deviation of 4.3 years, considerably less than the 22 years of tenure (s.d. of 12 
years) within the TMT as reported by Finkelstein and Hambrick (1990).  A number of reasons may account for the 
difference, with the primary being that the TMT tenure measure included each team member’s entire length of 
employment with the firm whereas our CEO tenure measure only accounted for years within the top management 
position to account for the CEO’s ability to affect strategic decision making.  Additionally, CEO tenure may be 
shorter in the long term than the overall management team and the team average may have masked this dynamic, or 
CEO employment length with the organization may have decreased over the intervening years to the two samples.  
Our more narrowly focused operationalization of tenure may be the primary reason for this variable’s lack of 
explanatory power. 
 
 
 
 
 
The sample of S&P 100 firms contained other unique characteristics in addition to the differences in CEO 
tenure.  Our original intention was to include CEO duality as a control for a CEO’s additional power and influence 
over the board.  While having the CEO serve as the chairman of the board may benefit the organization through the 
positive effects of unity of command, the negative effects of entrenchment (Finkelstein and Daveni 1994) may 
enable the CEO to persist with a dysfunctional strategic orientation.  After removing firms from the sample which 
had missing data, the remaining 215 observations (43 firms) all exhibited CEO duality, where the CEO was also 
serving as the chairman of the board.  While we questioned the impact of CEO duality on the likelihood of strategic 
Table 1
Pearson Correlation Coefficients of Variables in the Study
Mean
Standard 
Deviation SP1 BD SICA EMP ROA ROE SLACK
SP1 18.27 11.13
BD 1.29 0.71 0.2071
SICA 41.23 19.68 0.0827 - 0.2342
EMP 80.79 72.4 0.4890*** 0.0420 0.4391***
ROA 0.06 0.05 - 0.1424 - 0.0458 - 0.5119*** - 0.0498
ROE 0.21 0.25 - 0.2039 - 0.0049 - 0.1884 - 0.0329 0.5408***
SLACK 2.11 3.45 - 0.1931 - 0.0645 0.3599** - 0.1673 - 0.3216** 0.0320
CEOTEN 5.28 4.30 - 0.1660 - 0.0052 - 0.1906 - 0.1680 0.2509 0.5529*** 0.1252
*p<.10 **p<.05, ***p<.01 
* N=215, except for SP1 where N=43
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persistence, we had to eliminate it as a control variable from the analysis due to its total lack of variance in the data 
set.  Additional characteristics of the sample are discussed inline with the analysis results. 
 
Table 2 presents the regression results of the control model for the strategic persistence measure SP1.  This 
measure of strategic persistence is an aggregate of all six strategic indicators, including advertising and R&D 
intensity.  The overall control model was statistically significant at the 5% level, validating the existence of strategic 
persistence in our sample.  However, only two individual variables were statistically significant in their relationship 
to persistence – company size and CEO turnover in 2002.  Consistent with theory and prior studies (Finkelstein and 
Hambrick 1990; Audia, Locke et al. 2000), larger firms, which are subject to greater levels of organizational inertia, 
are associated with resistance to strategic reorientation. 
 
 
 
 
 
The positive and significant (p<0.05) relationship of a CEO succession event in year t-1, the initial year in 
the five-year time series, to persistence was unanticipated given the research into succession and its relationship to 
strategic change (Brown 1982; Tushman, Virany et al. 1985; Boeker 1997; Bigley and Wiersema 2002).  
Examination of the underlying data revealed that of the 43 firms in the remaining sample, 17 experienced a 
succession event during the five years of the study and an additional 15 firms had new CEOs at the helm in the two 
years proceeding the study period.  These succession events equate to 39.5% of firms experiencing a turnover during 
the study period and 74.4% having a new CEO over the extended 7-year period.  While a CEO succession event in 
years t and t+1 bore no significant relationship to strategic persistence, the exponentially increasing coefficients for 
the successive number of years a new CEO held the top management position may indicate a hypothetical timeframe 
in which they may establish policy and enact strategic persistence. 
 
Our results did not corroborate Finkelstein and Hambrick’s (1990) findings of a significant relationship 
between tenure and strategic persistence.  While the most likely cause is the construction of the CEO tenure variable 
as a measure of time in the position versus the team’s average years employed with the firm, there is a possibility 
that shorter TMT tenures and more rapid turnover of CEOs may be adversely affecting the relationship.  
Additionally, the control model for the second strategic persistence variable, SP2 (results omitted), was not 
significant.  The original intent of this four strategic indicator construct was to incorporate into the analysis firms 
Table 2
Control
Variable (N=215)
SICA 186.4394
EMP 865.4612***
ROA 35.8040
ROE 5.3051
SLACK 1.1594
CEOTEN 2.0733
CEOTURN2 368.39*
CEOTURN3 26.1396
CEOTURN4 7.1078
*p<.10 **p<.05, ***p<.01 
* N=215, except for SP1 where N=43
Results of GLS Regression on the Strategic 
Persistence of the Firm *
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from industries who relied more upon assets and resources (i.e. – natural gas distribution) than advertising and R&D 
intensity as key components of their strategic controls (Finkelstein and Hambrick 1990).  After eliminating 
observations with missing data from our sample, the remaining firms primarily represented pharmaceuticals, 
semiconductors, and petroleum refining, industries which rely heavily upon R&D and advertising as key 
components of their strategy.  The measure SP1 adequately captured persistence within these industries and 
rendered SP2 redundant and inconsequential with the lack of the two missing indicators. 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 3 details the results of our GLS regression analysis of strategic persistence on the log-transformed 
measure of board composition (BD).  According to our hypothesis that an agency-oriented board would be more 
likely to control or halt persistence, a negative and significant coefficient for BD would establish a negative 
(positive) relationship between an agency- (stewardship-) focused board and strategic persistence.  The board 
composition model was statistically significant at the 5% level.  The control variable size (EMP) remained positive 
and significant and the indicator for CEO succession in 2002 (CEOTURN2) exhibited an increase in both its 
coefficient value and its significance.  The variable representing board agency-orientation versus board stewardship-
orientation (BD) is positive but insignificant.  The positive coefficient would suggest that agency-focused boards are 
associated with strategic persistence and stewardship-focused boards are associated with reorientation.  Our first 
hypothesis is unsupported. 
 
The distribution of agency-oriented boards and stewardship-oriented boards in our sample may have been a 
confounding factor in our results.  Within the 215 observations over the five-year period, 37 of the remaining 43 
firms had either moderate agency (MA=21) or strong agency (SA=16) –focused boards.  The balance of 6 firms all 
exhibited neutral boards (# of inside directors = # of outside directors), and no firms in the remaining sample 
maintained a stewardship-oriented board.  While a small portion of firms in the original 500 observations from the 
S&P 100 index did have stewardship-focused boards (10 observations; 2 firms), these observations were eliminated 
due to missing critical data.  The lack of stewardship-oriented boards in the data set reduced the analysis to a 
comparison of weak agency control versus strong agency control. 
Table 3
SP1
Variable (N=215)
Intercept 18.9773***
BD 56.8226
SICA 175.1635
EMP 789.3409***
ROA 120.6594
ROE 37.6703
SLACK 4.9095
CEOTEN 15.2742
CEOTURN2 444.3685**
CEOTURN3 1.0018
CEOTURN4 0.7028
*p<.10 **p<.05, ***p<.01 
* N=215, except for SP1 where N=43
Results of GLS Regression on the Strategic 
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Table 4 provides results for the analysis of the degree of agency (stewardship) focus of the board and its 
relationship to strategic persistence.  As with the prior models, the degree of focus model was statistically significant 
(10% level).  Size (EMP) and CEO succession in 2002 (CEOTURN2) remained positive and significant, and the 
succession control variables again exhibited exponentially increasing coefficients for the successive number of years 
a new CEO held the top management position.  The variables representing degree of agency/stewardship orientation 
(BD1=neutral board; BD2=moderate agency; reference category=strong agency) were positive but insignificant.  
While the test of degree of board control in relation to strategic persistence is insignificant, the positive coefficient 
for a moderate agency board (BD2) in comparison to a strong agency control board (reference category) suggests 
that a moderate agency control board may bear a stronger relationship to strategic persistence than a strong agency 
board.  One might infer that a strong agency-oriented board may be more effective at controlling or halting strategic 
persistence pursued by the top management team.  The lack of significance for any of the board composition 
variables left our third hypothesis unsupported. 
 
DISCUSSION 
 
Scholars of agency theory have long argued that a critical role of the board of directors is monitoring of the 
top management team to reduce opportunism and moral hazard and to improve the alignment of management 
interests with shareholder interests.  The owners of the firm seek to maximize returns generated by firm activities, 
which is enabled by pursuing an appropriate organizational strategy.  This study examined whether the board of 
directors had an impact on the trajectory of organizational strategy, where the composition of the board might 
influence the likelihood of pursuing or halting a persistent, unchanging strategy.  Strategic persistence may arise 
from multiple sources, from organizational inertia to managerial complacency, and dysfunctional persistence in the 
face of environmental change can have detrimental effects on firm performance. 
 
Following Finkelstein and Hambrick’s (1990) methodology, we established the continued existence of 
strategic persistence in a more recent data set and our analysis found that firm size, engendering organizational 
inertia, remained a factor in organizational strategic persistence.  Although our main line of inquiry regarding the 
effect of board role orientation on strategic persistence was inconclusive, the analyses revealed a few interesting 
Table 4
SP1
Variable (N=215)
Intercept 21.7368***
BD1 0.1536
BD2 13.9101
SICA 232.2446
EMP 946.4557***
ROA 166.8709
ROE 23.2403
SLACK 3.3648
CEOTEN 7.2915
CEOTURN2 446.2363**
CEOTURN3 13.8500
CEOTURN4 3.9399
*p<.10 **p<.05, ***p<.01 
* N=215, except for SP1 where N=43
Results of GLS Regression on the Strategic 
Persistence of the Firm *
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observations worth considering.  A board that exhibited moderate agency-orientation displayed a more positive 
relationship to strategic persistence than either a neutral board or a strong agency-focused board.  This observation 
suggests that a board comprised of mainly outside directors may have the political wherewithal to influence 
managerial decision making and alter a course of strategic persistence where control is a crucial factor in the 
strategy formulation process.  Conversely, a neutral board, where power may be more evenly distributed between 
inside and outside directors, may benefit from the cooperation required to reach agreement, thus providing the 
organization with more strategic options through the advisory and consensus building process.  A moderately 
agency-oriented board, with its more positive relationship to persistence, may not be able to effectively reap the 
benefits of either control or collaboration and may only serve as window dressing in its purported function of 
representing shareholder interests. 
 
While one might expect to observe more outside director weighted boards in light of the need for owner 
representation given the separation of ownership and control (Berle and Means 1932), the utter lack of insider-
dominated boards in the broader sample, even when considering affiliated directors as more closely aligned with 
managerial interests, was surprising.  The dominance of agency-oriented boards might be a manifestation of change 
in board demographics due to Sarbanes-Oxley requirements, or the preponderance of outsider directors could be a 
response to a dynamic environment that requires greater access to external resources afforded by network 
connections of the directors.  Regardless of the source of an outsider-dominated board, a theoretical expectation set 
forth under the tenets of agency theory is that a board of this composition performs monitoring of and to some extent 
exerts control over the actions of the management team.  While the evidence did not establish a relationship between 
board composition and strategic persistence, the prevalence of persistence necessary to attain significant correlations 
within a sample comprised almost entirely of agency-focused boards calls into question the effectiveness of the 
board in its monitoring role.  Potential sources of this perceived ineffectiveness include the lack of will, 
organizational knowledge, or political power to influence the TMT, an inability to overcome organizational inertia, a 
belief that the firm is pursuing beneficial strategic persistence, or an inability to identify dysfunctional strategic 
persistence.  This study did not address the fundamental difference between beneficial persistence and dysfunctional 
persistence, which may have adversely affected the results as an agency-oriented board might choose to allow or to 
pursue strategic persistence when a firm is performing well.  Future inquiries into strategic persistence might benefit 
from the incorporation of trends of multi-period performance to better capture the effects of past performance on 
persistence (Anderson, Banker et al. 2003; Banker, Ciftci et al. 2008). 
 
In addition to the high proportion of outsider-dominated boards in the sample, the high CEO turnover rates 
may have impacted the analysis.  Strategic persistence is a phenomenon that develops over time and thus requires a 
certain longevity of conditions to establish its existence.  While the existence of persistence was established in the 
sample, the replacement of a CEO by over half of the firms during the two years proceeding and the first two years 
of the sample period likely diminished the relationships between tenure, managerial initiative, and strategic 
persistence.  The high turnover rate brought firm size and organizational inertia to the fore in producing persistence 
and minimized the role of the management team, especially since new teams are more likely to bring about 
reorientation (Tushman, Virany et al. 1985).  Additionally, because new CEOs are anointed by the board of 
directors, the positive relationship between agency-oriented boards and persistence might be a reflection of their 
alignment with and support of the initiatives undertaken by the new executive team. 
 
The relationship of CEO succession and accumulating tenure to strategic persistence was also of interest.  
While prior studies have examined the effects of CEO succession on strategic reorientation (Tushman, Virany et al. 
1985; Boeker 1997; Bigley and Wiersema 2002), few have considered the process and timeframe through which 
strategic persistence arises.  Our regression results found that the positive relationship between a new CEO and 
strategic persistence increased exponentially for each additional year they were in the position, and the relationship 
achieved significance in the fourth year of their tenure.  The impact of CEO longevity in the fourth year of their 
position was approximately half that of the effects of organizational inertia.  These initial findings suggest a 
timeframe over which managerial intention and strategic reorientation devolve into persistence and provide a 
starting point for board reevaluation of strategic direction during the term of a CEO. 
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LIMITATIONS 
 
As with most empirical studies, there are some limitations that warrant some discussion.  First, the source 
of our sample limits the generalizability of our findings.  This lack of generalizability is due to the large size of the 
sample firms, as well as the broad range of industries in which they originate.  While the range of industries 
provides some comfort about findings, industry idiosyncrasies in terms of accounting practices and policies may 
influence the relationship between financial performance metrics and other variables, thus, potentially making 
interpretation more difficult.  Second, the relatively small sample of 43 companies creates some limitations as to the 
strength of the findings.  Future research would benefit from a broader swath of firms.  Third, in our efforts to 
capture CEO turnover, we did not distinguish between retirement, reassignment, or termination, as reasons for 
turnover.  Accounting for these differences may provide additional information that could prove useful in the 
strategic persistence literature.  For example, intuition suggests that termination, especially due to 
underperformance, would be followed by strategic change.  However, turnover due to retirement, with a successor 
who has many years with the firm, may be linked with strategic inertia.  Future research could benefit from a more 
multi-dimensional view of the CEO turnover variable. 
 
In addition to these limitations, we note that an additional variable for top-management team tenure may 
have provided valuable information.  For the purpose of this study, we relied solely of CEO tenure, which is 
arguably a more volatile measure. 
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